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Globalization and Innovation: 
The Changing Economic Geography 
across the Taiwan Strait
Chen Shin-Horng and Wen Pei-chang Pam
I. Introduction
The last few decades have witnessed the upsurge of East Asia as a 
major manufacturing base within the developing world, initially as a 
result of the “catching-up” of the Asian “Newly Industrializing Coun-
tries” (NICs), and more recently due to the emergence of newly devel-
oping economies within the region, and of China in particular. These 
developments have much to do with both indigenous innovation and 
the relocation of the value chain activities of multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs). Lall elaborates on these two points, arguing that the per-
formance of countries like Taiwan and Korea may be attributed more 
to the former, while other less-advanced economies within the region 
may be gaining more momentum from the latter.1
However, certain news reports released in Taiwan seem to suggest 
an emerging structural shift in the economic geography of innova-
tion across the Taiwan Strait. For example, Ford Taiwan announced 
in December 2004 that in the next few years, their corporate mandate 
on business operations across the Taiwan Strait would shift towards 
China and away from Taiwan. In November 2003, a Taiwanese news-
paper reported that the head of the Sun’s Research and Development 
(R&D) lab in Beijing had been sent to Taiwan to evaluate the feasibil-
ity of establishing an R&D branch in Taiwan. More recently, it was 
reported in April 2006 that the first Chinese-design car model for GM 
would be introduced to and made in Taiwan.2
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All of these developments give rise to important questions concern-
ing a shift in the balance of power across the strait in terms of R&D and 
innovation. Taiwan is evidently ahead of China in economic develop-
ment, but is it equally true in terms of R&D and innovation? China is 
a latecomer, but can we project its developmental trajectory according 
to Taiwan’s experience? Is China just a “low-cost manufacturing pow-
erhouse”?
As a matter of fact, some researchers in the Western world have 
begun to address such questions as: Can China (and India) redefine 
the technological world order? Will China become a regional, if not 
global, technological power? The emergence of China, going hand in 
hand with the trend toward globalization, would arguably reshape the 
global technological landscape.
Against this background, the essay sets out to examine the economic 
impact of globalization and the rise of China from the perspective of 
Taiwanese high-technology industy, and information technology (IT) 
in particular. As a country with geographical and cultural proximity 
and close economic ties with China, and widely known for its high-
technology industry, Taiwan’s experience with China may help to shed 
light on what the rise of China economically, together with the trend 
toward globalization, may mean to its neighboring countries in the 
region and even to the world economy.
II. Globalization and Knowledge-Based Innovation
The trend toward globalization involves a process of increasing disin-
tegration of production around the globe, and even disintegration of 
innovation capabilities,3 with the result that some, if not many, of the 
indigenous firms and/or industrial clusters in the developing world 
are nowadays able to shoulder important functions that used to be 
undertaken by their counterparts in the developed world. For one 
thing, outsourcing and offshoring, not only in manual but also knowl-
edge work, have become widely-adopted practices in quite a number 
of industries as a means of enabling brand marketers to remain cost-
competitive, which arguably would lead to further disintegration of 
innovation capabilities on the global scale.
Product innovation involves an assortment of knowledge related to 
various stages of the value chain. Knowledge applied to manufactur-
ing, marketing, and customer services is complementary to the knowl-
edge used in product innovation. Vertical integration of the innovation 
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function in the value chain is only justified, however, if internalization 
is the best way to acquire the relevant knowledge, and this is not often 
the case. Since product innovations address the needs of customers, 
the type of knowledge most valuable to product innovation is that 
which is obtained from interacting with customers; in a word, market-
ing. Therefore, product innovation combined with marketing may be 
the optimal mix of services offered by a firm. In the traditional indus-
tries, such as footwear and apparel, Nike, Reebok, and Calvin Klein are 
typical examples of this innovator-marketer combination. This trend 
towards the emergence of innovation and marketing as the core func-
tions of a firm is even taking place in the high-technology industries. In 
the IT industry, for example, integrated device makers (IDMs), includ-
ing Apple, HP, Dell, and Motorola, have partitioned themselves from 
manufacturing, which is now delegated to contractors.
In addition, in many cases, innovations involve technical systems 
that are inherently large in scale, comprising a set of jointly-consumed 
interdependent products.4 On the basis of the network effects and prod-
uct compatibility, successful innovations for technical systems entail 
intensive interfaces between multiple actors with different knowledge 
and skills bases, referred to as “innovation networks.” By implication, 
not only does such an innovation often result from the collective efforts 
of inter-related firms, but it also demonstrates that the value chain 
does not need to be completely internalized within individual firms. 
In many cases, therefore, industrial competition takes place between 
rival technological and production networks that contain a multiplic-
ity of differentiated firms, rather than between vertically integrated 
oligopolies.
We also have to take into account the nature of knowledge-based 
innovation in order to better undertand the changing dynamics of the 
evolution of the international innovation landscape. Various kinds of 
knowledge differ in their degree of codification,5 path-dependence,6 
and complexity. As a result, certain kinds of knowledge-based inno-
vation will allow for the possibility of leapfrogging, as opposed to 
incremental changes, as well as an international division of labor. For 
example, with regard to the degree of codification, knowledge can be 
broadly classified into articulated (explicit) and tacit (implicit) knowl-
edge. One of the benefits of information technology is that articulated 
knowledge is easily and widely transferable.7 In addition, codification 
of knowledge may also facilitate the possibility of modularization. 
Conversely, tacit knowledge is socially or organizationally embedded 
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and cannot be easily transfered through formal channels of informa-
tion but may be transfered by means of networking.8 Thanks to codifi-
cation and modularization of certain types of knowledge, IT has made 
it possible for R&D to be conducted in an internationally coordinated 
way, giving rise to a global R&D network of firms. This seems particu-
larly true for software-related R&D, which has become more receptive 
to modularization.
More importantly, where a technology is less path-dependent, the 
firm or industry concerned may have a better chance to bypass certain 
stages of the technological trajectory, or to jump straight into a new 
generation of technology, or even to surpass the previously dominant 
firm to become a new leader (as in Schumpeter’s widely known “cre-
ative destruction”) because of disruptive technological innovation. A 
typical example at issue is the new industrial standard, TD-SCDMA, 
for third-generation mobile communications (3G), which, despite the 
low mobile phone penetration rate on the Chinese mainland, has been 
proposed by China and accepted by the International Telecommu-
nications Union (ITU). Another example lies in the area of software, 
because new learners can enter directly and learn the new version (or 
generation) of software without the need to go through previous ver-
sions.
In our opinion, for a country to leapfrog, several conditions must 
be met. Firstly, the country needs to have a sound science base and/or 
vigorous creativity, or more broadly distinct intangible assets, based 
on which the country may be able to make breakthoughs in emerging 
technologies. Secondly, some proportion of the country’s population 
should be able to and also wish to consume state-of-the-art products 
so that market demand in the country may serve to drive new techno-
logical innovation. The third, though not necessary, condition is that 
the relevant industry in the country should be well-equipped with 
capabilities along the value chain, based on which new technological 
innovation at the indigenous initiative level can be commercialized.
The above discussions tend to imply that given the possiblity of 
leapfrogging, one cannot project China’s developmental path based 
merely on the previous trajectory of Taiwan’s own experience.
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III. Taiwanese IT Industry’s Pathway to Innovation 
and Industrial Migration
As a small country, some aspects of Taiwan’s performance in techno-
logical innovation are impressive. According to surveys by prestigious 
international organizations, such as WEF and IMD, Taiwan has often 
enjoyed impressive international rankings on several fronts of techno-
logical innovation as well as economic performance. In particular, in 
terms of U.S. patents granted, Taiwan has ranked fourth for six years in 
a row (1999–2004), second only to the U.S., Japan, and Germany. In this 
regard, the electrical and electronic machinery, equipment, and sup-
plies sector outnumbers all other product fields, registering an increase 
from 2,013 to 7,644 in the second half of the 1990s. Similarly, Taiwan 
claimed 1,669 patents granted in Japan in 2002, ranking only behind 
Japan, the U.S., and Germany. All these taken together may imply 
that Taiwan’s industries, the IT sector in particular, have moved from 
foreign technology to indigenous innovation.9 However, in sharp con-
trast, Taiwan has been faced with a huge and increasing deficit in tech-
nological trade. In other words, Taiwan’s achievement in international 
patenting is not proportional to its trade balance in technology.
The so-called “innovation paradox” portrayed above may be attrib-
uted to some characteristic features of Taiwan’s industrial and S&T 
system. First of all, Taiwanese high-tech firms are generally character-
ized by vertical disintegration and are deeply involved in OEM con-
tacts for brand marketers; thus, individual firms specialize in a specific 
industrial and technological segment and may tend to focus their R&D 
efforts on incremental technological change in relation to a specific 
technological trajectory, leading to the rapid proliferation of patents. 
Secondly, following closely from this, Taiwan’s export-oriented high-
tech firms tend to pursue technological innovation on the pathway led 
by the architectural design created by leading brand marketers. As a 
result, the more their production volume expands, the more royalties 
they pay to the brand marketers. Thirdly, while excellent in quantita-
tive terms, Taiwan’s international patents are generally not so impres-
sive in qualitative terms. For example, the U.S. utilities patents held 
by Taiwanese usually prove to be quite low in terms of their “science 
linkages” by international standards. Over the period 1995–1999, Tai-
wan’s utilities patents granted in the U.S. registered a science linkage 
index of 0.18, which was far below the international average of 1.97. 
In particular, the indexes for two of Taiwan’s mainstream high-tech 
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fields (computers and peripherals, and semiconductors and electron-
ics) were merely around 0.26 and 0.22 respectively, and again far below 
the international average (1.37 and 1.21 respectively).10 By referring to 
these indexes, it can be argued that Taiwan’s U.S. patents are gener-
ally not so knowledge-intensive, let alone influential and valuable, as 
the so-called international industrial standards. Fourthly, the service 
industry currently accounts for more than 70 percent of Taiwan’s GDP, 
but suffers a huge deficit in trade in services, especially in terms of the 
mode of commercial presence.11 This may in part contribute to the size 
of Taiwan’s trade balances in technology, especially in regard to inter-
national franchises in services.
All these reasons behind Taiwan’s innovation paradox have to do 
with some of the characteristic features of Taiwan’s IT industry. From 
its inception, the development of Taiwan’s IT industry was driven by a 
strategy of vertical disintegration, which in turn facilitated the forma-
tion of local and cross-border linkages as the momentum for industrial 
expansion. One aspect of globalization over the last few decades has 
been the increasing disintegration of capabilities in production, and 
even innovation, across nations.12 Driven by this disintegration, the 
outreach of MNCs has taken the form of not only direct investment, 
but has also increasingly involved the outsourcing of production and 
even knowledge. As a result, boundaries between firms have become 
blurred on an international scale,13 which has eroded the basis for the 
formation of traditional oligopolies. Instead, industrial rivalry now 
tends to occur amongst industrial networks that are comprised of a 
multiplicity of firms linked by different knowledge bases. Although 
the driving seat is occupied mainly by well-established firms in the 
advanced nations of the world, firms in countries such as Taiwan also 
have a role to play.
In fact, ever since the 1980s, the IT industry has increasingly become 
the paramount engine of economic growth in Taiwan. On a world-
wide scale, Taiwan currently ranks as the fourth largest producer of 
information hardware, the fourth in the case of IC, and the third in the 
optical electronics area. As to the communications sector, despite a less 
impressive world-wide ranking, Taiwan has recently experienced an 
explosive growth in mobile communications. With particular regard 
to the information hardware industry, a number of Taiwanese-made 
products have enjoyed a significant global market share. What under-
lies this are the well-regarded production and design capabilities of 
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the Taiwanese IT producers, which in turn have made Taiwan a major 
source of contract work for prominent international IT companies.
Taiwan’s characteristic local industrial clusters and their role in the 
growth of the PC industry in the economy have been well scrutinized,14 
but local agglomeration alone can no longer adequately account for 
the dynamics of Taiwan’s PC industry, because while global produc-
tion networks have come to the fore, the way in which the global 
PC industry is organized has changed. An important milestone in the 
development of Taiwan’s PC industry in this regard was the outreach 
achieved by local firms, beginning in the late 1980s. Their outward 
investment was initially directed towards Southeast Asia, but more 
recently towards China and elsewhere in the world. The offshore pro-
duction of Taiwan-based PC firms right now significantly outweighs 
their domestic production.
With the PC industry’s drive to reduce production costs, lead-time 
to market, and inventory costs came a profound change in the manu-
facturing system and inter-firm competition. It became commonplace 
for components to be sourced from a global network of suppliers and 
for final assembly to be done within the end-market.15 Specifically, 
major brand marketers moved to adopt outsourcing and order-based 
production, which greatly rationalized their global supply chain, and 
hence altered their contractual relationships with Taiwan’s firms.
Such contractual arrangements with global leaders in the PC indus-
try have prompted Taiwan’s IT firms to upgrade their position within 
the global production system. Taiwan’s firms began to shoulder the 
essential functions of coordinating the global supply chain for their 
OEM customers. For example, under its new business model, HP out-
sourced every element of the value chain except marketing to Tai-
wanese subcontractors, and imposed a “98-3” operational formula on 
subcontractors, requiring them to collect 98% of the components and 
parts needed for product within three days of the order and to ship the 
product within six days of receipt of the order. In doing so, a number 
of brand marketers completely handed over inventory costs to these 
subcontractors, who were also required to produce and deliver subsys-
tem products on tight schedules and in tune with the vagaries of mar-
ket demand. The Taiwanese firms had to ensure that everything was 
synchronized up and down the supply chain. In order to do this, they 
had to participate in cross-border supply-chain management, logistics 
operations, and after-sales services. In addition, to coordinate all of 
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these, they had to form a fast-response global production and logistics 
network.16
As part of this process, recent years have witnessed a new phase 
of cross-Strait industrial interaction. The newly emerging geographi-
cal concentration of investment in the Long River Delta by Taiwan-
based firms, notably in the broadly-defined IT industry, suggests that 
Taiwan’s outward investment in China is becoming more technology-
intensive and capital-intensive. Indeed, in recent years, the electronics 
and electrical appliances industry has accounted for approximately 
40% of Taiwan’s annual outward investment in China. More impor-
tantly, China has become an increasingly important offshore produc-
tion site for Taiwan-based PC firms, having significantly outweighed 
the latter’s domestic production since 2002.
Along with this process, there is an evolution of the industrial land-
scape in the global IT industry, or more specifically the PC and IC 
sub-sectors, as illustrated by Figure 1. In the 1980s when the industry 
was dominated by vertically integrated firms in advanced economies 
like the United States and Japan, their outward investment in Taiwan 
triggered the entry of Taiwan into the value chain at the mass-produc-
tion level. In particular, the local firms were able to take up the vacuum 
caused by the withdrawal of foreign firms during the mid-1980s, which 
then laid the foundation for the formation of the local industrial clus-
ters. The 1990s witnessed the emergence of such economies as Taiwan 
and South Korea as the major players in subcontract work for brand 
marketers in the advanced economies, partly because of the rising pop-
ularity of outsourcing. Along with this development, OEM, which used 
to be the major business of the IT firms in Taiwan and South Korea, has 
gradually given way to ODM and, to a lesser degree, to production 
under brand names, thus facilitating their involvement in the design 
value chain at the mass-production level. Meanwhile, China’s “open 
door” policy and the outreach of Taiwan’s IT firms fuelled China’s 
rising significance in the assembly and manufacturing of IT products. 
Ever since the turn of the new millennium, the evolution has gone fur-
ther to realize the involvement in R&D of the IT firms in both Taiwan 
and South Korea. In the meantime, China’s coverage of the value chain 
at the mass-production level has become more comprehensive. There 
are even signs that China is increasingly playing a non-negotiable role 
in R&D, a point we shall return to later.
In fact, elsewhere, based upon the result of a survey, we have shown 
that China has become the major target for Taiwanese IT firms’ off-
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shore R&D, certainly in quantative, though not necessarily qualitative, 
terms.17 Based upon firm-level interviews conducted on both sides 
of the Taiwan Strait, it became possible to identify certain patterns of 
cross-Strait R&D deployment by some of the Taiwan-based IT firms. 
First of all, while the Taiwan-based firms’ production lines are con-
centrated in China (as well as some other countries), product devel-
opment is undertaken in Taiwan, and manufacturing-related R&D 
and engineering support are performed in China. This often entails 
the de-linking of R&D and manufacturing. Secondly, some Taiwanese 
firms outsource their software development services to China, partly 
because of the leapfrogging potential of software. The third type of 
portfolio involves a tendency for some Taiwanese firms to perform 
(mostly problem-solving) basic research in China to take advantage of 
the strength of the local science base, which often entails collaboration 
with universities and/or research institutes. The fourth type has some 
Taiwanese firms performing their upstream (core) R&D (or R&D for 
products at the development stage) within Taiwan, while their sub-
sidiaries in China carry out downstream (non-core) R&D (or R&D 
for products at the mature stage). Finally, there are also those cases in 
which Taiwanese firms perform R&D in China for the domestic mar-
ket, while in Taiwan for the international market. In essence, it appears 
that the cross-Strait production and innovation network is evolving 
alongside its global counterpart and hence is becoming more complex.
On balance, global production networks in the IT industry have 
come to the fore. Characteristic features of the global production 
networks include cross-border modularized production and speedy 
patchy production, instead of production under one roof and mass 
production as before (see Figure 1). Therefore, from the standpoint of 
Taiwan’s IT producers, the triangular linkages involving Taiwan (Hsin-
chu), China (the Long River Delta), and the U.S.A. (Silicon Valley) may 
mean much more to their prosperity than does the local industrial 
cluster in Taiwan.
The IC sector can be considered another driver of Taiwan’s success 
in the IT industry. The global IC industry is currently dominated by 
firms from the U.S., Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, with their worldwide 
rankings shown in this order. Of interest is the fact that the industry in 
Taiwan differs from that in the other three in several significant ways. 
Unlike Korea, which specializes in the production of dynamic random 
access memory (DRAM), Taiwan produces a much wider variety of IC 
chips, and dominates in foundry services, capturing around 70% of 
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the global market share. Additionally, in contrast to the vertically inte-
grated conglomerates that dominate the industry in Korea and Japan, 
Taiwan’s IC industry consists of many small firms specializing in a 
narrow range of the value chain, such as IC design, mask production, 
foundry service, packing, and testing. In a sense, Taiwan’s IC industry 
is organized as an industrial network with a strong connection to Sili-
con Valley, the worldwide center of the IC market and IC technology.
Significantly, the development of Taiwan’s IC industry has been 
driven by organizational innovation, with foundry services created as 
a market niche to specialize in production for external customers. By 
disintegrating the IC value chain, the emergence of foundry services in 
Taiwan facilitated the proliferation of small- and medium-sized firms 
engaged in other market segments, such as IC design, testing, and 
packaging, which gave rise to a balanced and vertically disintegrated 
industrial structure. In particular, fabless IC design houses prolifer-
ated in Taiwan in part because access to external fabrication capacity 
lowered the barriers to entering the IC design market. In addition, 
the concentration of IC and computer-related firms in the Hsin-Chu 
Science-Based Industrial Park generated agglomeration effects that 
R&D level Mass production level
Design(D) Design method / CAD / IP Layout, Prototype, 
Theoretic test, etc.
Manufacturing(M)  Development of new 
process, new equipment, 
new materials
Front-end: Fab, mother-
board, etc.
Assembly(A) Application of new 
packaging, modular, 
materials, etc.
Back-end: Packaging, 
Assembly, etc.
Source: Nikkei Micro Device, quoted in MIC ITIS Project August 2002.
Figure 1: The Evolution of the Global IT Production and Innovation Networks.
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allowed those firms to exploit the benefits of proximity and outsourc-
ing. Therefore, even though they specialize in one segment of the value 
chain or another, IC firms in Taiwan are networked by social and busi-
ness connections.
Moreover, Taiwan’s IC industry is closely connected with the indus-
try center in Silicon Valley. Taiwan’s strength lies in its foundry ser-
vices, which depend on substantial investment in fabrication capacity. 
The U.S. IC firms, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on R&D, 
design, and marketing functions, which are backed up by access to 
Taiwan’s foundry service capacity. In fact, more than half of Taiwan’s 
foundry capacity in 2000 was used to serve U.S. customers, and most 
of the top ten fabless makers in the U.S. have been clients of Taiwan’s 
foundries. TSMC, the world’s largest foundry service provider, shares 
its resources and information with its customers, considering them 
partners. This sharing of resources and information not only facilitates 
the development of close long-run relationships with customers, but 
also helps reduce the uncertainty on both sides over technology devel-
opment.
Another facet of the connection between the IC industry in Tai-
wan and in the U.S. is the intensive interchange between specialists 
in both economies. Underlying this exchange are Taiwanese and Chi-
nese expatriates, who have played important roles in establishing the 
trans-Pacific social and business networks that have proved crucial 
in connecting Taiwan’s production system with advanced market 
knowledge and technology.18 Apart from the ethnic social network, the 
fact that the IC industrial systems in both Taiwan and Silicon Valley 
are decentralized and network based facilitates the interchange. This 
type of industrial system encourages the pursuit of multiple technical 
opportunities, heavy reliance on outsourcing, and interorganizational 
knowledge flows.19 The similarity in industrial structure makes net-
working between Silicon Valley and Hsinchu Science-Based Park, the 
centre of Taiwan’s IC industry, much easier and more intensive.
IV. A Structural Shift of Innovation across the Taiwan Strait?
Despite the success story described above, there seems to be a trend 
towards a structural shift of innovation across the Taiwan Strait, which 
may not be favorable to Taiwan. For one thing, the outreach of Taiwan-
ese IT firms towards China has brought about a concern over the hol-
lowing-out of manufacturing in Taiwan. In fact, thanks in part to the 
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Taiwanese IT firms’ outreach, China has surpassed Taiwan and more 
recently the U.S., becoming the top IT producer in the world. More-
over, there is increasing concern that Taiwan’s IT sector has in fact been 
facing an era of “razor-thin profits.” There is even evidence to suggest 
that Taiwan’s IT industry is facing a bottleneck, which is character-
ized by the slow growth of value added, deteriorating value-added 
ratios, and a decrease in the industrial linkage effect, which may have 
something to do with the trend toward globalization and the industrial 
development model of the Taiwanese IT industry.20
More importantly, alongside the trend of R&D globalization, China 
has demonstrated its potential to become a regional hub for foreign 
direct investment in science and technology, and more specifically a 
focal location of MNCs’ offshore R&D facilities in the region. The R&D 
activities of MNCs were initially geared to the developed countries, 
but the emphasis has more recently shifted towards the developing 
world.21 For example, while two-thirds of the R&D engaged in over-
seas in 2000 by U.S.-based MNCs ($13.2 billion of $19.8 billion) took 
place in six countries, namely, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, 
Japan, France, and Sweden, certain emerging markets, mainly in Asia, 
have played an increasing role in U.S.-owned overseas R&D.22 In par-
ticular, such countries as India23 and China24 have become high-profile 
host countries for MNCs’ offshore R&D facilities, albeit in their late 
developmental stage.25 According to a survey regarding the host coun-
tries of MNCs’ offshore R&D facilties, China’s ranking (in terms of the 
percentage of the surveyed firms with offshore R&D in a particular 
country) is as high as third for 2004, second only to the U.S. and U.K. 
The same survey also reveals that for the period 2005–2009, China 
would top all of the countries, becoming the hot spot of the MNCs’ 
offshore R&D facilities worldwide.
In fact, several studies have documented a significantly rising trend 
of MNCs’ R&D in China from the early 1990s onward.26 High-profile 
examples at issue include quite a number of MNCs in the IT sector, 
such as IBM, Microsoft, Motorola, Intel, Nokia, etc. Data gathered by 
the U.S. government reveals that U.S.-based MNCs spent US $506 mil-
lion on R&D in China in 2000, which was second to just Singapore 
and Israel in Asia (excluding Japan). Both Lieberman27 and Moris28 
based on data gathered by the Department of Commerce, go further 
to show a dramatic increase in U.S.-based firms’ R&D investment in 
China, with the ratio of R&D expenditure to gross products rising from 
1.7% in 1998 to 8.1% in 1999, and further to 9.2% in 2000, significantly 
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increasing its rank as a host of U.S.-owned overseas R&D from 30th in 
1994 to 11th in 2000.
In particular, Walsh has reported that R&D by high-tech MNCs in 
China seems to have evolved in three distinct stages.29 The initial stage 
is described by as “exploratory and strategic partnerships” (early to 
mid-1990s), motivated by the primary purpose of entering the Chinese 
market by forming strategic alliances with local firms. As a result, the 
MNC’s R&D at this stage can be characterized as “show R&D activity.” 
From the mid to late1990s came the stage termed “expansion of R&D,” 
witnessing the proliferation of MNCs’ R&D facilities in China. This 
was mainly driven by the local IT market boom, by China’s imminent 
accession to the WTO, and by the governmental policy encouraging 
China to “Go West.” The third stage, from the late 1990s onward and 
termed a “consolidation of R&D,” is marked by a more considered, 
strategic approach to R&D investment by MNC in China. According 
to Walsh, driven by increasing pressures on high-tech industry and 
growing global competition for international R&D, a number of MNCs 
are now shifting their R&D in China toward more advanced R&D 
activities, while consolidating their overall number of research-related 
programs.
It should also be noted that, to a degree, some of the MNCs in Taiwan 
have also invested in R&D. From the dataset provided by the Invest-
ment Commission at the MOEA, we can calculate that R&D intensity 
(R&D/sales) for foreign-owned subsidiaries in Taiwan’s manufacturing 
sector has increased from 1.52% in 2002 to 1.94% in 2003; this perhaps 
indicates that Taiwan’s mandate has significantly improved in terms of 
MNCs’ regional or global innovation networks.
Elsewhere, the authors have been able to identify, with statistical 
robustness, those foreign R&D subsidiaries with a higher R&D inten-
sity in Taiwan.30 We find that those foreign-owned firms in Taiwan 
with a higher export propensity tend to be more R&D intensive. As an 
economy characterized by international competitiveness and export-
orientation, Taiwan may be able to act as a host for some MNCs in 
order to capitalize on its comparative advantages to serve the interna-
tional market.
Foreign-owned subsidiaries with higher R&D intensity are also 
characterized by a greater degree of localization in terms of their sourc-
ing of both production materials and capital goods. To interpret this 
finding, one can refer to Westney’s arguments that MNCs’ offshore 
R&D units are given higher hierarchical mandates if their ties with the 
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local scientific and technological community are gaining strength (and 
probably, therefore, greater R&D intensity).31 To put this another way, 
for countries such as Taiwan, “first-tier supplier advantage” can be 
regarded as a locational advantage capable of attracting the offshore 
R&D units of MNCs, which may imply that foreign-owned subsidiar-
ies with a higher degree of localization may need to devote more effort 
to R&D in order to effectively interact with their local suppliers.
On top of that, the government in Taiwan has orchestrated a plan 
to encourage MNCs to establish R&D centers on the island. Since its 
implementation in 2002, this has met with some success. Currently, 
there are in Taiwan some 30 MNCs’ R&D facilities established or prom-
ised by 27 different firms. Prominent cases include HP, IBM, Dell, 
Motorola, Microsoft, and Dupont. Of note is the fact that these R&D 
centers are mainly related to the current strength of Taiwan’s indus-
trial development, with the lion’s share being focused on the broadly-
defined information technology (IT) area and exhibiting a strong 
intention to collaborate with local firms.
Referring to a few cases of MNCs with offshore R&D facilities on 
both sides of the Strait, however, we find that those foreign R&D cen-
ters in Taiwan tend to be mandated as product development centers, 
while their counterparts in China tend to function as research labs.32 
This may have something to do with the features of Taiwan’s NIS in 
terms of the IT industry.33 From the perspective of the evolutionary 
approach to technology34 what a firm and an economy can do—or is 
about to do—is linked strongly to their routines and previous bases.35 
As we discussed elsewhere,36 it can be argued that the mainstream 
of Taiwan’s industrial technological innovation currently lies in the 
central part of the “smiling curve,” which ranges from incremental 
technological changes to defensive patents. In addition, it is generally 
perceived that the IT community in Taiwan undertakes more “D” than 
“R.” The MNCs may therefore feel more comfortable in capitalizing on 
the strengths of Taiwan’s national innovation system by establishing 
product development centers.
In contrast, while China is behind Taiwan on the ladder of economic 
development, there exists in China the possibility of leapfrogging 
development, which may allow a firm to bypass certain stages of the 
technological trajectory, or jump straight into a new generation of tech-
nology. Apart from having a large pool of R&D personnel and mar-
ket potential, China’s science and technology system formerly placed 
relatively greater emphasis on basic research, partly because of the 
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arms race during the Cold War period. In addition, China’s economic 
development has come to the stage where some proportion of the 
Chinese population may be able to consume state-of-the-art products. 
This may equip China with leapfrogging potential on the demand side. 
Therefore, it makes sense for some of the MNCs to set up research labs 
in China and to conduct more advanced R&D activities,37 although the 
bulk of foreign R&D in China may be related to adaptive R&D.38
Based upon an intensive case study, we have put forward a holistic 
view of possible R&D portfolios of a few flagship MNCs across the 
Taiwan Strait,39 as shown in Figure 2. In essence, based on the heritage 
of industrialization, Taiwan has been able to capitalize on its first-tier 
supplier advantage as a means of attracting a few MNCs to set up their 
offshore R&D facilities on the island. As a result, those MNCs tend to 
conduct certain types of R&D in Taiwan, ranging from medium-term 
product/process applied development, to short-term innovation and 
prototype development, to significant adaptation and improvement 
to existing technologies. In contrast, to quite an extent, while the bulk 
of foreign R&D in China may be related to adaptive R&D,40 some (if 
not many) of the MNCs are conducting strategic R&D in China, such 
as “blue sky” or basic research and medium-term product/process 
research.
It then comes down to the question of what such an R&D portfolio 
across the Strait means to the prospects of Taiwan and China respec-
tively. To answer this question, one can refer to the well-established 
argument in economic geography that location does not necessarily 
make sense if linkages do not exist.41 Research is the upstream part 
of the R&D process, while Development belongs to the downstream 
part. Some might hence get an impression that Research conducted 
by the MNCs may mean more to the host country than Development 
does. Such an impression can be oversimplified. Instead, we would 
like to argue that “D” conducted by the MNCs in Taiwan often entails 
close interactions with indigenous firms and hence could bring ben-
efits to the local economy in an immediate and direct way. In contrast, 
with regard to “R” conducted by the MNCs in China, it has to take 
time—not to mention the risk involved—for results from the “R” to 
bear commercial fruit. However, where the “R” involves emerging 
technologies and/or industries, it is possible that R&D conducted in 
China can redefine the technological order across the Taiwan Strait, 
if not the world. This will become more likely if R&D conducted by 
MNCs in China eventually go through the commercialization process 
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by working together with China’s indigenous value chain, giving rise 
to leapfrogging development in China.
In fact, China’s progress in leapfrogging is not just about achieve-
ments in attracting MNCs’ R&D facilities, but also concerns industrial 
standards and global outreach in terms of outward investment and 
mergers and acquisitions. Taking industrial standards as an example, 
it has been placed at the top of the policy agenda in China to acquire 
autonomous intellectual property rights by establishing its own indus-
trial standards. Typical examples at issue include TD-SCDMA for 3G, 
digital TV, and Linux-based operational systems. In all these cases, 
China intends to explore its leapfrogging potential to eventually com-
pete with the global leaders. It is too early to judge whether or not 
China will succeed in generating an influential industrial standard 
with commercial success, especially outside China. However, it is fair 
to say that through policy exercises in developing industrial standards, 
China has managed to substantially restructure its innovation system 
in a few specific sectors. For example, since TD-SCDMA has been rec-
ognized by the International Telecommunications Union as one of the 
industrial standards for 3G, China has managed to receive endorse-
ment from global flagship firms like Siemens, Nortel, TI, and Philips. 
Together with these flagship firms, a wide spectrum of the value chain 
for mobile communications has already taken root in China.
V. Conclusions
Taiwanese IT firms have traditionally entered a particular product 
market as “fast followers” during the growth stage, with a key success 
Figure 2: Possible R&D Portfolio of Flagship MNCs across the Taiwan Strait
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factor being the capacity to combine low-cost production in Taiwan 
with a rapid response to changes in markets and technology. Nowa-
days, however, it is far too simplistic to state that Taiwan’s success in 
the IT industry is attributable to manufacturing muscle alone, as is the 
thesis on Taiwan’s local industrial clustering.
On the one hand, there are grounds to suggest that Taiwan’s IT sec-
tor has moved from foreign technology to indigenous innovation.42 On 
the other hand, Taiwan’s IT industry has gone global and become an 
essential part of the global production and innovation network. The lat-
ter, in particular, has much to do with the trend towards globalization 
and the rapid emergence of China. As a result, Taiwan’s IT industry is 
facing a bottleneck. It is fair to say that the Taiwanese IT industry is 
not without R&D and innovation, but the current development model 
in many respects lacks value creation. In addition, the outreach of Tai-
wanese IT firms towards China has brought about a concern over the 
hollowing-out of manufacturing in Taiwan.
More importantly, the emergence of China is, in some aspects, char-
acterized by leapfrogging, which may entail a structural shift of innova-
tion across the Taiwan Strait. Clayton Christensen has argued that such 
countries as China and India may bring about “the great disruption,” 
and “technologies emerging from these countries may have profound 
but unpredictable implications for the rich world’s markets.”43 On the 
technological side, this article has shown that by taking advantage 
of its leapfrogging potential, China outperforms Taiwan in attracting 
MNCs’ offshore R&D facilities, which tend to be given a higher R&D 
mandate. This may eventually lead to a structural shift of innovation 
across the Taiwan Strait.
Quite often leapfrogging is not considered relevant to Taiwan 
because of the seemingly plausible argument that Taiwan’s domestic 
market is not big enough. Such an argument, however, may not hold 
if one takes into account an often ignored feature of industrial techno-
logical innovation. For some industries and service sectors, the outputs 
generated by innovative efforts can be replicated with negligible costs, 
implying an “out-of-proportion” phenomenon of the initial develop-
ment costs in relation to replication costs for innovation. In such a case, 
as long as Taiwan’s domestic market is large enough to allow an inno-
vator to recover its initial development costs, leapfrogging remains 
possible for Taiwan. This is particularly true for sectors where innova-
tive outputs are intangible in nature. A typical example concerns Hou 
Hsiao-Hsien, a famous native movie director, whose films (which are 
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deeply rooted in Taiwan’s soil) have successfully penetrated the inter-
national market. On balance, it is necessary and feasible for Taiwan 
to explore its leapfrogging potential in certain niche areas, in pursuit 
of industrial technological innovation and national competitiveness. 
In this regard, the home market should serve as an “innovaion trig-
ger,” instead of a “reservoir,” in case of oversupply in the international 
market. •
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